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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2649 
___________ 
 
ARTHUR WAYNE WHITE, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
  Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A71 769 035) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 7, 2011 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 11, 2011) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Arthur Wayne White, a citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States in 
1992 as a nonimmigrant, and later adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident.  In 
December 2009, White pleaded guilty in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas to 
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delivery of a controlled substance (crack cocaine), in violation of 35 Pa.. Stat. Ann. § 
780-113(a)(30).  The next year, the Government served White with a Notice to Appear, 
charging him with removability for having been convicted of an aggravated felony as 
defined in Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 101(a)(43)(B) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B)] (illicit trafficking in controlled substance), see INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
[8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)], and for having been convicted of a controlled substance 
offense, see INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)].  White, who identified 
himself as bisexual, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) based on his sexual orientation.  
 In February 2011, White appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).  White 
explained that he was known in Jamaica as being homosexual because he had been 
molested as a child by a male cousin, George Passley.  He also stated that he had been 
assaulted by neighbors and classmates because of his sexual orientation.  After one such 
fight, White went to the police station, where an officer told him that homosexuals can be 
killed in Jamaica.  White’s sister testified that Jamaica is a homophobic society and 
confirmed that White frequently got into fights growing up because he was accused of 
being gay.  She also stated that Passley’s father was killed in a fire which was set by 
arsonists who were motivated by Passely’s perceived homosexuality.  White also 
presented the State Department Country Reports for Jamaica, which included a section 
pertaining to “Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity.” 
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 The IJ sustained the aggravated felony charge and concluded that White’s 
conviction rendered him ineligible for any relief other than deferral of removal under the 
CAT.  With respect to CAT eligibility, the IJ found that White’s evidence was 
insufficient to meet his burden of showing that he would more likely than not be tortured 
in Jamaica.  In particular, the IJ determined that White was credible, that “it is [not] a 
stretch . . . to characterize Jamaican society as homophobic,” but that “because of the 
sparsity of the evidence . . . [White] just has not been able to meet his burden of proof.”  
The BIA dismissed White’s appeal, agreeing that while “there is evidence of significant 
problems faced by homosexuals in Jamaica, . . . the evidence does not establish that 
[White] is more likely than not to be tortured upon return to Jamaica . . . .”  The BIA also 
rejected White’s claim that the IJ was biased and concluded that White had waived any 
claims related to the IJ’s conclusion that he was ineligible for asylum and withholding of 
removal.  White filed a timely pro se petition for review of the BIA’s decision.   
 We generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against a criminal 
alien, like White, who is removable for having committed an offense covered in INA 
§ 237(a)(2).  The Court retains jurisdiction, however, to review “constitutional claims or 
questions of law” raised in a petition for review.1  INA § 242(a)(2)(D) [8 U.S.C. 
                                              
1
 Whether White’s conviction constitutes an aggravated felony is a question of law. 
Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).  Importantly, however, White 
did not raise this issue in his appeal to the BIA.  Therefore, as the Government properly 
notes, we lack jurisdiction to the extent that White now seeks to challenge the basis for 
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§ 1252(a)(2)(D)]; Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005).  With 
respect to CAT claims, the question of the likelihood of torture is a mixed one, comprised 
of a factual component (“what is likely to happen to the petitioner if removed”) and a 
legal one (“does what is likely to happen amount to the legal definition of torture”).  
Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010).  Thus, we may review White’s 
claim that the BIA erred in its application of the law governing CAT protection to the 
undisputed facts of record.  Toussaint v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 409, 412 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006).  
The relevant question is whether White “has identified … evidence to compel the 
conclusion that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured upon return to 
[Jamaica].”  De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 357 (3d Cir. 2010).  “Torture is 
defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining . . . information or a 
confession, punishing . . . for an act, . . . intimidating or coercing, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).  Such torture must be 
“inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  Id.  
 We conclude that the facts concerning what is likely to happen to White, as found 
by the IJ, do not meet the legal definition of torture.  The IJ stated that Jamaican society 
is homophobic.  Indeed, the 2009 State Department Country Report for Jamaica indicated 
                                                                                                                                                  
his removability.  INA § 242(d)(1) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)]; Wu v. Att’y Gen., 571 F.3d 
314, 317 (3d Cir. 2009).  
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that the law criminalizes homosexual conduct, which is punishable by up to 10 years of 
imprisonment.  In addition, that Report noted the murder of a prominent gay rights 
advocate, physical assaults on homosexuals, targeted attacks against a gay rights 
advocacy group and its members, and the failure of the police to investigate such 
incidents.  The IJ also described the testimony provided by White and his sister.  White 
claimed that he had been assaulted by neighbors and classmates because he was 
perceived to be gay.  White’s sister confirmed this account, and explained that their 
uncle’s house had been burned because his son, who had molested White, was perceived 
to be homosexual.  Based on this evidence, the IJ found that “there could be random 
violence against Mr. White.”  Ultimately, however, the IJ concluded that it was unlikely 
that White is “going to be detained at some point by someone who is not part of the 
government, that the government would be aware he is being detained and is going to be 
subjected to torture, and that the government would undertake no efforts to intervene to 
prevent such nefarious activity.”  Given this unreviewable factual determination about 
what is likely to happen to White, we must conclude that the legal definition of torture 
has not been satisfied in this case.   
 Finally, White alleges that the IJ was personally biased against him, as 
demonstrated by comments made at the beginning of a preliminary hearing.  During the 
hearing, at which White submitted his asylum application,  the IJ stated, “I need to submit 
[the asylum application] to the Department of State, even though it’s a worthless 
endeavor.  Totally worthless endeavor.”  The Board concluded that the IJ’s comments 
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“reflect[ed] . . . frustration with some of his required processes, but does not suggest any 
prejudgement [sic] or bias on the [IJ’s] part concerning [White’s] claim.  We agree.  The 
IJ was apparently referring to the requirement that asylum applications be submitted to 
the State Department for its optional review and comment.  8 C.F.R. § 208.11(a).  The 
“worthless endeavor” did not pertain to White’s application itself, but to the process of 
submitting the application for review by the State Department.  In fact, the IJ thoroughly 
reviewed White’s allegations on their merits.  Therefore, we conclude that the IJ’s 
comments did not demonstrate bias.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
